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Debating Somali Identity in a 
British Tribunal: 
The Case of the BBC Somali Service
Abdi Ismail Samatar
I. Introduction
The Somali Peace Conference sponsored by the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), held in Kenya in 2003–05, was 
dominated by warlords and partisan mediators.1 It endorsed a political 
strategy whose objective has been to recreate Somalia as a clan-based 
federation. Advocates of this approach claim that such a dispensation 
will approximate the society’s pre-colonial tradition and therefore has 
the best chance of restoring peace. An argument put forward in sup-
port of this agenda is that Somalia’s former governments, particularly 
the military junta, misused public power by favoring and rewarding 
certain genealogical groups.2 Proponents contend that formally and 
openly using genealogical divisions as a basis for distributing public 
appointments and resources will prevent future clanist favoritism. This 
approach to political reconstruction mimics Ethiopia’s seemingly novel 
political project, which divided the country into nine “ethnic prov-
inces” in 1991.3 In the case of Ethiopia, the presumed rationale for this 
political strategy was to overcome past domination of the state by one 
ethnic group, rather than to revert to an old tradition. The imposition of 
Amharic culture and language on Oromos, Somalis, Afars, the people 
of the southern region, and other groups throughout the state—and 
the denial of their human rights—rationalized re-engineering the new 
order. The challenge for Ethiopia post-1991 has been how to undo past 
subjugation without reifying cultural differences politically.4 Dividing 
each country into administrative units based on ethnic belonging, the 
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proponents argue, will promote democracy and produce a civic order 
in which no one ethnic group or clan dominates others.
The Ethiopian and Somali developments depart from the African 
nationalist project that recognized tribal and ethnic political divisions 
as colonial instruments intended to facilitate imperial rule. These two 
cases are indicative of a growing and troubling political trend in the 
continent that turns cultural differences into state-driven political proj-
ects. In an ironic historical twist, some African leaders and previously 
dominated communities have endorsed cultural politics that mimic 
the colonial era, during which ethnic groups were segmented into 
political clusters (or tribal reserves). Elsewhere, individuals have been 
disenfranchised due to their supposed ethnic roots. For example for-
mer Zambian president Fredrick Chaluba attempted to deprive Ken-
neth Kaunda, his predecessor and the leader of the country’s national 
liberation struggle, of his citizenship by claiming that Kaunda was a 
foreigner. Similarly, the current Ivorian president sought to rob the 
country’s former prime minister of his citizenship in order to ensure 
that the latter could not challenge him for the presidency. Reinventing 
past colonial tradition has inspired not only sectarian political entre-
preneurs but also an intellectual and development industry centered 
on “ethnic conflict resolution.”5 This enterprise, whose major con-
cern is defining ethnic identity in the context of political crisis, draws 
directly or indirectly on colonial social anthropology.
This essay presents a British court case to illustrate the arguments of 
two competing schools of thought in Somali Studies: one that defines 
Somali political conflict as quintessentially traditional clanism and its 
opposite, which contests the conflation of political discord with genea-
logical differences. The central bone of contention in this debate is 
the nature of Somali political identity. One thesis claims that Somalis 
consist of ethnically distinct groups and that any political, social, or 
professional association among Somalis should balance its member-
ship, if it is to be legitimate, on the basis of these distinctions. The con-
trary scenario posits that Somalis are one ethnic group sharing broad, 
regionally based cultural and social values but differentiated into sev-
eral genealogical groups. Those who advance this thesis contend that 
transforming Somalis’ genealogical differences into political, social, 
and professional instruments will destroy values they share and will 
undermine their sense of civic belonging. Furthermore, they add that 
accepting genealogical variation as the basis for political intercourse 
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and public policy is not part of the old Somali tradition but a legacy of 
the colonial strategy of “divide and rule.”
The essay is divided into four sections. The first briefly sketches an 
influential recent contribution to the debates regarding the nature and 
dynamics of African cultural and political identity. This intervention, 
which builds on an old discourse in anthropology that dealt with the 
relationship between power and ideas, is vital if one is to productively 
navigate through the current dialogue on identity and political crisis 
in Somalia. The second section provides a snapshot of recent debates 
in Somali Studies that attempt to explain the origins of the country’s 
political crisis. It identifies the philosophical differences between the 
two main theses in the debate centered on identity. The dominant the-
ory in Somalist discussions asserts that indifference to the centrality of 
clan identity in public affairs has been a major factor in Somali political 
crises. Advocates argue that the current predicament can be resolved 
by recognizing “traditional” clan identity as the foundation stone for 
the reconstruction of legitimate political and professional life. Oppo-
nents posit that Somalia’s calamity is a product of the politicization of 
genealogical difference and that the remedy to this crisis is to remove 
genealogy from state-driven politics. They note that recent experiences 
indicate that a clan-based strategy will only deepen divisions among 
Somalis rather that healing the discord. The third section presents a 
case heard before a British tribunal that demonstrates the critical dif-
ference between the two schools, as represented by the expert testi-
mony of British social anthropologist I. M. Lewis and geographer Abdi 
I. Samatar. Each testimony is reproduced verbatim to avoid misrepre-
sentation and is introduced by a short paragraph highlighting its key 
points. Finally, the conclusion draws on the significance of the case for 
studying Somali society, identity, and politics.
II. Culture, Politics, and the Genealogy of Ideas
It is not a matter of dispute that social anthropology emerged as a dis-
tinctive discipline at the beginning of the colonial era, that it became a 
flourishing academic profession towards its close, or that, throughout 
this period, its efforts were devoted to a description and analysis carried 
out by Europeans, for a European audience of non-European societies domi-
nated by European power. And yet there is a strange reluctance on the part 
of most anthropologists to consider seriously the power structure within 
which their discipline has taken shape6 (emphasis added).
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The social sciences and anthropological analyses of post-colonial soci-
eties have gone through a sea change since Talal Asad wrote that semi-
nal essay in 1973. Central to Asad’s intervention was the significance 
of political and economic power in understanding the dynamics of 
“native societies” and the effects colonialism has had on local tradi-
tions and on the ways non-Western anthropologists studied such soci-
eties. Mahmood Mamdani, in a landmark study, reignited this debate 
by accentuating the enduring legacy of European political domination 
of Africa.7 The core of Mamdani’s argument is that colonial restructur-
ing of African societies conflated political and cultural identities in the 
continent by turning Africans into tribal subjects administered through 
“traditional authority,” and Europeans and other non-natives (such as 
Indians) into races governed by civil law. A major consequence of this 
schema was that although non-Europeans in Africa were discriminated 
against, and despite the fact that they had cultures different from the 
“master” race, nonetheless they were considered part of the civilized 
community.8 By contrast, Africans who shared similar cultures were 
divided into separate tribal traditions:
[E]ven if races were as different culturally as whites, Asians, and Arabs, 
they were ruled under a single law, imported European law, called civil 
law. Even if their languages were similar and mutually intelligible, tribes 
were governed under separate laws, called customary laws, which were 
in turn administered by ethnically distinct native authorities. With race, 
the cultural difference was not translated into separate legal systems. 
Instead, it was contained, even negotiated, within a single legal system, 
and was enforced by a single administrative authority. But with ethnics, 
the case was the opposite: cultural difference was reinforced, exagger-
ated, and built up into different legal systems and, indeed, separate 
administrative and political authorities. In a nutshell, different races were 
meant to have a common future; different ethnicities were not.9
The enduring effect of this political strategy was to fragment Afri-
cans into separate groups in such a way that each “group” related 
subordinately to the master race and its state. Opportunistic distribu-
tion of favors among the tribes by colonial authorities, combined with 
uneven peripheral capitalist development, ensured the reproduction of 
political boundaries between “ethnic groups.” Over time, these identi-
ties gained a reality and logic of their own, defined in relation to state 
authority and the distribution of public resources. Mamdani contends 
that colonial powers sowed the seed of a new politics laced with a 
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reactionary view of tradition. He insightfully characterizes Western 
colonialism as the beginning of a new fundamentalist order:
[C]olonial powers were the first fundamentalists of the modern period. 
They were the first to advance and put into practice two propositions: 
one, that every colonized group has an original and pure tradition, 
whether religious or ethnic; and two, that every colonized group must 
be made to return to that original condition, and that return must be 
enforced by law. Put together, these two propositions constitute the basic 
platform of every religious or ethnic fundamentalism in the postcolonial 
world.10
Mindful of the risk that his analysis might be misunderstood, he 
accentuates the crucial difference between non-statist cultural tradi-
tions and those centered on state power:
It is not that ethnicity did not exist in African societies prior to colonial-
ism, it did. I want to distinguish between ethnicity as cultural identity—
an identity based on shared culture—and ethnicity as political identity. 
Ethnicity as cultural identity is consensual, but when ethnicity becomes 
political identity the legal and administrative organs of the state enforce 
it. After making a distinction between ethnic groups, between those con-
sidered indigenous and those not, these organs proceed to discriminate 
against them…The distinction between cultural and political identities 
is important for this argument. As a rule cultural identities are noncoer-
cive, consensual, voluntary, and can be multiple…A legal identity is not 
voluntary nor is it multiple. The law recognizes you as one, and as none 
other. Once it is enforced legally cultural identity turns into a legal and 
political identity. Such an identity cannot be considered a vestige of tra-
dition because of its ancient genealogy, nor can it be dismissed as just an 
invention of the colonial power because of its legal enforcement.11
This rearticulation of the distinction between the old non-statist tra-
ditions and their colonial reincarnation is a vital idea to remember in 
order to grasp the historical origins of the current resurgence of ethnic 
politics in Africa.
Mamdani’s intervention, informed by the experience of either settler 
societies of East and Southern Africa or those societies hosting signifi-
cant “non-African” immigrant populations with wide cultural differ-
ences, does not exhaust the imprint of colonial rule on Africa. Colonial 
and post-colonial political identity was tribalized even in those Afri-
can societies that shared common linguistic, religious, economic, and 
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other social morés. The form such politicization of ethnicity took was 
different from that described in Mamdani’s work, since colonial and 
post-colonial authorities could not anchor this new identity on dis-
tinct language or other cultural differences. Instead, they selected an 
element of the old culture, such as genealogy, that appeared to dif-
ferentiate groups from one another. Once genealogy was identified as 
the basis of colonial political organization, native relations with the 
state were mediated through community elders transformed into state 
vassals, the tribal chiefs.12 Further, uneven commercialization of the 
pre-colonial economy induced differentiation between regions and, 
consequently, between genealogical groups. These two processes gen-
erated competition between groups for colonial favors, which fostered 
their perceived ethnic dissimilarity. The colonial project was paradoxi-
cal, however, since it not only generated the ethnicization of politics 
and administration but also instigated changes that undermined it. 
Both colonial education and the commercialization of the economy 
became major driving forces in uniting Africans to challenge European 
domination and discrimination. Entrepreneurs and professionals who 
were denied access to opportunities for accumulation and advance-
ment, and rural producers who were onerously exploited through 
taxes and market interventions, joined efforts across “tribal” or genea-
logical divisions to mount the nationalist project.
Although independence was a critical benchmark for African lib-
eration, many in the movement did not realize that colonialism had 
changed their traditions in ways that could undermine the nationalist 
project.13 The vital issue for Africans was how to overcome the afore-
mentioned two elements, which reinforced each other: uneven devel-
opment and ethnic politics. Many post-colonial leaders, despite their 
commitment to the nationalist project, internalized the logic of uneven 
development and ethnic politics, overtly or otherwise, and deployed 
the latter when others challenged them for leadership positions.14 In 
other words, their nationalism defined their political identity only if 
they were secure in their positions of power. Examples of exceptions 
to this pattern include leaders from Botswana, Somalia, and Tanza-
nia. Many leaders’ conditional commitment to the nationalist project 
instigated two tendencies in post-colonial African politics: one strove 
to create national belonging anchored in a civic identity, while its con-
verse peddled exclusivist ethnic politics. Even in countries where the 
civic project has been successful, such as South Africa and Botswana, 
ethnic politics have not disappeared, and rearguard struggles continue 
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between the two agendas. Elsewhere on the continent, where ethnic 
politics became dominant, social and economic disasters have invari-
ably become the legacy of liberation. In extreme cases, the outcome has 
been catastrophic, as in Rwanda and Somalia.
III. The Somali Conundrum
In spite of the enormous advances made in Africanist scholarship 
since the early 1970s, Somali Studies remained locked in traditional 
social anthropology. I. M. Lewis, one of the defenders of the old school 
against the onslaught of critical anthropology in the early 1970s (noted 
in the volume edited by Asad), has been the dominant figure in Somali 
Studies. In contrast to the advances pertaining to the study of power, 
politics, culture, and identity, Lewis’s conventional ideas of genealogy 
and tribes (clans) have reigned supreme in Somalist scholarship.15 Else-
where on the continent, African scholars became significant contribu-
tors to intellectual production, but Somalis had to wait until the late 
1980s and early 1990s to engage these debates and write about their 
own society.16 In addition to the few Somali writers, a new generation 
of scholars began to emerge as political/economic calamities engulfed 
Somalia over the past two decades. They recognized the limited ana-
lytical scope of traditional social anthropology to illuminate the Somali 
challenge, and this predicament compelled them to look into the con-
ceptual toolbox of African and Third World studies. Their search cul-
minated in the discovery of social history and political economy as 
a new theoretical tradition in Somali Studies. This discovery created 
the basis for an alternative to social anthropology for grappling with 
Somali reality, particularly in such matters as politics, development, 
culture, and identity.17
The first major Somali contribution to the new theoretical tradi-
tion was Ahmed I. Samatar’s Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality 
(1988). Developments in theoretical thinking in social history, political 
economy, and dependency theory inspired this study. Although the 
book was a clear and substantial theoretical departure from the social 
anthropological and modernist tradition, it did not explicitly single out 
Lewis’s framework for criticism. But a year later came an open Somali 
challenge to that framework.18 This contribution contested the veracity 
of Lewis’s concepts and its ahistorical interpretations of Somali social 
and political history:
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The principal thrust of his analysis of the (de)composition of precolonial 
Somali society and the contours of its current social geography…the 
Lewisan interpretation…assumes that the…evolution of Somali society 
has been quantitative in nature despite its articulation to and integration 
into colonial empire…Symptomatic of this view is the unproblematic 
deployment of such important and theoretically loaded concepts as the 
state, tribalism, and pastoralism transhistorically.19
Since these early rumblings, four new analytical threads have 
emerged. These are regional social historical studies;20 gender and 
race;21 political economy;22 and cultural investigations.23
The collapse of the Somali state and the disintegration of political 
and civic order in 1991 challenged both old and new ways of study-
ing Somali society, but very few writers responded imaginatively to 
the test. Much of the post-1991 production reinforced the old scholarly 
tradition, maligned nationalism,24 and went further to argue for frag-
menting the nation into discrete tribal fiefdoms. Indeed, some authors 
divided Somalis into warlike tribes and peaceful communities,25 not 
realizing that their prescriptions reinforced the very divisions that had 
brought about the misfortune, while some analysts redeployed the 
tribalist thesis.
In 1994, Ahmed I. Samatar took the lead in casting a schema for 
comprehending the transformation of the old Somali tradition.26 In a 
path-breaking essay, he mined Somalia’s collective cultural memory 
and presented an innovative reading of the essence of the kinship 
tradition without turning it into that anthropological fossil, the clan. 
Somali identity is thus conceived of as a product of several mutually 
constitutive forces whose roles are historically and socially contin-
gent. Among these are language, genealogy, Islam, traditional social 
contract (Xeer), and a mode of economic reproduction. Some of these 
factors were exclusive, such as male genealogy (tol), while others were 
inclusive (xidid); some were localized, while others were broader in 
their reach and scope. Further, new elements were added to the reper-
toire, while others were re-emphasized and still others declined in sig-
nificance, as the Somali community’s fortunes necessitated. The central 
point to underscore is that Somali identity and tradition were never 
determined by any one element but were always a living and ongo-
ing process resulting from multiple interactive forces.27 These complex 
processes generated the regional variations—for example, dialects and 
cuisine—that were the hallmark of Somali tradition. For instance, diet 
Bildhaan  Vol. 10
44
in the cultivated regions of the northwest and the south, and in the 
coastal settlements, was different from the more pastoral areas of the 
north and central regions, while poetry, language, religion, and dress 
were national in scope.
In a parallel vein, Lidwien Kapteijns took up the most neglected 
aspect of the social structure, namely gender.28 Her ongoing project 
has opened up fresh and exciting venues for research aimed at better 
understanding old historical contours as well as the rapidly changing 
gender landscape the Somali catastrophe has induced, both inside the 
country and in the diaspora.29 This theme has far-reaching implica-
tions for gender identity, which Somalist anthropologists have vir-
tually ignored. A similar research agenda on race, which rarely got 
scrutiny, was vigorously put on the agenda by Catherine Besteman.30 
Besteman’s contribution emphasizes the significance of race as an iden-
tity marker in the Somali world.
A third theme superseded conventional analysis of the civil war 
and of clan identity. It examines the struggle over land resources in 
southern Somalia.31 This collection of essays edited by Besteman and 
Cassanelli does not share an overarching theoretical framework. How-
ever, it does emphasize the role resource struggles played in the civil 
war and how identity issues are implicated in such struggles. Unfortu-
nately, the contributions do not distinguish between the old scarcity-
driven local conflicts and more recent state-induced ones. Noting such 
dissimilarity is vital, as it dovetails with the ways in which identity 
and access to resources are constructed. The substantive thread that 
runs through the entire text draws on a regional history whose trade-
mark is the ebb and flow of social processes and whose elucidation is 
found in the work of Peter Little.32
A related and final challenge was how to explain the link between 
Somali politics, Somali culture, and the chaotic civil war. A standard 
approach has been to think of the civil war as a tussle between clans. 
The argument has been that the nationalist project undermined tradi-
tional clan structure by not anchoring politics and administration in 
clan identity. The end result of the misplaced ambition of the nation-
alist movement has been the demise of the ungrounded state order.33 
Building on the literature on resource struggles challenges this essen-
tialist reading of politics and culture. Using a comparative study of 
Somalia and Botswana, one piece of research has demonstrated that 
two contradictory tendencies (one inclusive—civic—and the other 
exclusive—sectarian) competed for dominance in national politics. 
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Contrary to the clan-centered analysis, the evidence from this work 
illustrates that when the civic project has prevailed in public affairs, 
it reinforced legitimacy, national belonging, and democratic culture.34 
Abdi I. Samatar (the author of this article) introduces the concept of 
shared values as a way of underscoring that the crisis was induced 
not by nationalism but by clanism.35 The argument is that the cultural 
values Somalis shared were necessary but insufficient to sustain the 
country unless the authorities reinvested in those values in the form 
of inclusive and democratic institutions. The Botswana and Somali 
evidence confirms the claim that national institutions that are inclu-
sive prevent divisive politicization of cultural traditions and the resul-
tant social and political fragmentation. Conversely, when sectarian or 
clanist politics became the lifeblood of public affairs, the consequences 
have been ruinous.
Faced with the above developments, Lewis, the doyen of the old 
school, endeavoured to turn back the intellectual clock by arguing in 
familiar terms that the marginalization of the clan in national affairs 
has led to the favoritism that hobbled the nation.36 He advanced the 
proposition that a Somali’s belief in the clan structure defines his fun-
damental political identity. Consequently, any attempt to rebuild a 
national political order must reflect clan divisions among Somalis if 
the new government is to survive and have legitimacy. The creation of 
a confederation of clan states, therefore, is the best expression of Lew-
is’s political advocacy, which, ironically, dovetails with the demands 
of sectarian politicians, warlords, and faction leaders. Thus far, Lewis 
has been unable to explain how politicized genealogical differences 
will pave the way for a national dispensation whereby all Somalis are 
citizens with equal rights. This silence is especially peculiar in light of 
the malice of politicized clan fiefdoms in different parts of the country 
since the early 1990s.
Lewis not only elevates the saliency of clan identity, but has revised 
some of his earliest writings on Somali society in order to provide 
a cultural (ethnic) rationalization for his clan-based political project. 
His revisionist thesis that Somali genealogical groups are distinct cul-
tural/political clusters echoes colonialist perceptions as described by 
Mamdani.37 Lewis’s attempt to fuse genealogical and political identity 
collided with political-economy and social-historical approaches in a 
British employment court in 2001. The case, which involved a claim 
of employment discrimination at the British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (BBC), took on added meaning because of its broader potential 
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political ramifications. The question before the tribunal was this: Are 
Somali genealogical groups different ethnic and racial communities? While 
mindful that the court is not the proper arena in which to resolve the 
intellectual tussle between the two paradigms, nevertheless, this case 
highlights an important moment in the debate that has far-reaching 
implications for public life in Somalia.
IV. The Case
The BBC Somali Service, a branch of that organization’s World Service, 
has been broadcasting programs in the Somali language since 1957. 
The organization’s Somali employees are mainly announcers, while 
the producers and management were mostly British until recently. The 
first Somali manager to oversee the section, Mohamed Abdillahi, was 
appointed in the early 1990s. Somali journalists employed by the BBC 
had hitherto had one of two types of contracts: long-term and casual. 
Senior African Service management decided in 2000 to streamline 
Somali Service staff; they abolished casual contracts and consolidated 
those positions into three long-term posts.38 Simultaneously, three 
members of the Somali Service competed for the top job, and the man-
agement appointed Yusuf Garaad, the youngest candidate, to head the 
service.
All former casual employees could reapply and compete with 
outside applicants for the new full-time appointments. The search/
examination process had three parts: application letters and résumé 
evaluations; written and voice tests; and, finally, formal interviews in 
person or by telephone. The written test and the interviews took place 
in several locations in Europe, Africa, and North America. Garaad 
and the BBC’s personnel officer screened 200 application letters and 
résumés. They short-listed 160 of the applicants, including seven of 
the eight former casual employees who applied. The next step in the 
procedure was for those who were short-listed to take the written and 
voice tests. Candidates’ names were removed from the answer sheet 
and replaced with code numbers. Garaad and Abdillahi Haji, a vet-
eran senior producer in the Somali Service, graded the examinations. 
The two evaluators divided the test papers into two sets, and each 
graded one set of the papers. They then agreed to a short-list of 35 can-
didates.39 Of the 35 candidates who qualified for a final interview, six 
were former casual employees. Garaad and Kari Blackburn, the man-
ager of the BBC’s Africa Service, jointly conducted the interviews and 
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selected the top four applicants, one of whom they placed on a reserve 
list. Blackburn and Garaad were in complete agreement on the list of 
top candidates.40
At this time, Garaad expressed concern that former employees who 
were not successful might lodge complaints. Moreover, he told Black-
burn that they could be accused of favoritism as a result of the finalists’ 
common genealogical pedigree. Garaad’s remarks did not alarm Black-
burn.41 The BBC announced the examination results soon after Black-
burn and Garaad made their decision in Mogadishu. To everyone’s 
surprise, none of the BBC’s former casual employees were among the 
winners. The top-ranked candidates were little-known young journal-
ists who hailed from the same genealogical group in the south of the 
country as Garaad.
The surprising success of three unknown journalists who shared 
common ancestry with the Somali Section head created fertile ground 
for speculation and political machination. Shortly after the BBC 
announced the results, stunned former casual employees claimed that 
the search/examination process was rigged. They accused Garaad of 
nepotism and petitioned the BBC authorities to investigate their claims. 
The heads of the Africa and Middle East Service and the World Service 
conducted two separate investigations and announced that the search/
examination process was conducted professionally and fairly. Shortly 
thereafter, former casual employees mobilized their communities in 
London and organized demonstrations outside Bush House, the site 
of the BBC World Service. To register their displeasure with the selec-
tion results, many demonstrators chanted “Throw out the warlord.” 
The demonstrators’ reference to the “warlord” had a double meaning. 
First, they wanted to highlight the genealogical link between the head 
of the Somali Service and one of Mogadishu’s notorious warlords, Gen-
eral Aideed. Second, they intended to convey to the authorities that 
Garaad, like his “kinsman” warlord in Mogadishu, arbitrarily used 
public power to reward his genealogical group. Although this strategy 
had little traction and failed to convince senior management of the 
Africa and World Services to reconsider their decision, Garaad was 
shaken by the comparison.
Former casual employees sought redress in an employment tribunal 
after they exhausted BBC’s internal appeal process. They claimed that 
Garaad had given undue advantage to the successful candidates by 
favoring his own genealogical group and that this had resulted in their 
unfair dismissal because of their clan identity. Further, they contended 
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that this amounted to racial or ethnic discrimination on the basis of 
clan affiliation.42 Because of the claim of ethnic or racial prejudice, the 
tribunal instructed each side to engage an expert witness in order to 
establish whether discrimination on the basis of clan affiliation could 
come under the purview of the British Race Relations Act of 1976.43 
The applicants (petitioners) retained I. M. Lewis, a retired professor of 
anthropology from the London School of Economics and a renowned 
expert on Somalia. The BBC engaged Abdi Ismail Samatar, a geogra-
phy professor at the University of Minnesota with Somali expertise. 
The two experts produced several reports describing the role of gene-
alogy or “clans” in the constitution of Somali identity. Through their 
lawyers, Lewis and Samatar exchanged several reports that the tribu-
nal studied to make its final decision. The expert witnesses were also 
cross-examined before the tribunal.
V. The British Race Relations Act of 1976
The British Race Relations Act of 1976 establishes the legal understand-
ing of ethnic and racial discrimination in the United Kingdom. This Act 
legally defines what constitutes an ethnic or racial group. According to 
the Act, an ethnic group must regard itself, and be regarded by others, 
as a distinct group because of certain fundamental characteristics. Two 
of the key features a group must possess to be considered an ethnic 
group are (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as 
distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which keeps 
it alive, and (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and 
social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with 
religious observance. The Act also identifies a number of other relevant 
features of an ethnic or racial group. One or more of these character-
istics will commonly be found and will help to distinguish the group 
from the secondary community. They include:
•  either a common geographical origin or descent from a small number 
of common ancestors;
• a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group;
• a common literature peculiar to the group;
•  a common religion different from that of neighboring groups or from 
the general community surrounding it; and/or
•  a history of being an oppressed minority or a dominant group within 
a larger community.44
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The applicants and respondents asked their expert witnesses to 
answer the following question: Do Somali clans constitute different 
ethnic groups or races? Lewis’s and Samatar’s briefs were to explain 
whether Somali genealogical groups form distinct ethnic/racial groups 
in accordance with the British Race Relations Act, not to judge whether 
the BBC Somali Service had engaged in discriminatory practices in 
its hiring process. What follows reproduces the two expert witnesses’ 
written submissions.45 The materials appear in the order in which they 
were delivered. Lewis wrote the first submission, Samatar responded, 
and then a series of responses and rebuttals followed.46 Lewis and 
Samatar were not in direct contact and exchanged their pieces via the 
respective attorneys. In order to avoid any possibility of misrepresen-
tation, each submission is presented here verbatim. The only insertions 
are footnote numbers and italicized words to highlight a point.
VI. The Experts’ Arguments
Lewis fired the first shot by stressing that clan affiliation has singu-
larly defined Somali identity, irrespective of historical era. His written 
testimonies did not directly confront the question the tribunal posed in 
reference to the British Race Relations Act by providing clear examples 
of how the four “major” genealogical groups (Hawiye, Darod, Dir, 
and Rahan Weyn) satisfy the Act’s tenets. Instead he contended, in 
his first submission, that Somali clans constitute distinct ethnic and 
racial groups, contrary to his early scholarship (1961, 1988, 1993).47 
Four broad ideas guide Lewis’s first submission. First, he conflates 
genealogy with clanist politics and the associated recasting of Somali 
identity. This enables him to claim a changeless nature for Somali iden-
tity. Second, the submission indicates that the Somali nationalist proj-
ect was misplaced, since it attempted to deny the centrality of clan 
identity. Third, Somalis trained in the West are Westernized unless 
they conform to his idea of the “native.” Accordingly, Westernized 
Somalis deny their clan identity, just like the nationalists, and fail to 
comprehend the traditional rootedness of Somali character. (He does 
not quite explain how Lewis “the Westerner” is able to discern this 
culture.) Fourth, each clan or “descent group” has unique features 
that naturally predispose its members to look down on non-members. 
Thus, Lewis is able to deny critical regional commonalities shared by 
different genealogical groups, such as dialect and mode of life. Further, 
he attempts to play down the significance of intermarriage.48
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VII. Lewis’s First Submission
Dear Mr. Hanley:
You asked me for information about Somali clans, how they oper-
ate, their Somali context to identity based on “ethnicity” or race. I am 
happy to provide this since this is a form of social and political organi-
sation on which, as a professional Social Anthropologist, I have been 
specialising for almost fifty years. I have published a great deal on this 
type of kinship organisation in technical anthropological books and 
journals including my paperback textbook, Social Anthropology in Per-
spective. It is also described and analysed in its Somali context in detail 
in my A Pastoral Democracy which has recently been republished. I 
have in fact written numerous books (the most recent Saints and Soma-
lis) and over a hundred articles in learned journals on various aspects 
of Somali society.
I find that I am generally regarded internationally as the leading 
academic authority on Somali issues, and am frequently consulted by 
governments and the media on Somali matters. My academic position 
is Emeritus Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Eco-
nomics (London University) and I am a Fellow of the British Academy 
(for fuller information, see Who’s Who entry).
I shall now try to answer your questions about Somali “clans.” 
Somalis receive their fundamental social and political identity at birth49 
[emphasis added] through membership of their father’s clan. Clan iden-
tity is traced exclusively in the male line through their father’s paternal 
genealogy (abtirsiinyo: literally “counting ancestors,” in Somali). Chil-
dren, at an early age, are taught to recite all their paternal ancestors up 
to the clan ancestor and beyond that the ancestor of their “clan-family.” 
This is a technical term, which I use to designate the largest clan group-
ings in the Somali nation, viz. Dir, Isaaq, Darod, Hawiye, and Digil and 
Rahanweyn. These are the largest and most widely distributed units 
within the nation. Traditionally, and still to a large extent, the Dir, 
Isaaq, Hawiye and Darod clans are nomadic pastoralists, whereas the 
Digil and Rahanweyn are agropastoralists who live with a mixed farm-
ing economy in the Bay Region of south-west Somalia between the 
Juba and Shebelle rivers.
Despite changes associated with the growth of towns and mod-
ernisation generally, clan (and clan-family) identity remains of funda-
mental importance today both inside Somalia and in Somali refugee 
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communities scattered around the world: Somali clans even have their 
own web-sites on the internet! The Somali Republic which fell apart 
in 1990/91 after the overthrow of the dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre, 
fractured basically along clan lines. This was despite the fact that clan 
identity had been officially outlawed under the banner of “Scientific 
Socialism” and clan behaviour made a criminal offence (not, of course, 
when graced by Siyad and his clan coterie).
In the course of the collapse of Siyad’s regime and the invasion of 
the capital, Mogadishu, by Habar Ghadir (Hawiye) clan militiamen, 
all the rival clan groups practised vicious “clan-cleansing,” as Somalis 
called it by analogy with Bosnia. And at the height of the conflict in 
the city, people whose clan identity was not known were challenged at 
gun-point to recite their genealogies. If they came up with the wrong 
pedigree, they were summarily executed, or worse.
In the 1960s earlier Somali nationalists, genuinely seeking to estab-
lish a viable national solidarity transcending clan loyalties, had hit on 
the idea of treating clan identity as a thing of the past and consigning it 
to history under the label “ex-clan.” This was also associated with the 
totally unjustified view that clans were “primitive” and implied that 
Somalis were unable to operate in the modern world. The word “ex” 
was even adopted into Somali as an alternative to the Somali term for 
clan. This form of what psychiatrists call “denial” did not, of course, 
solve the problem in a clan-riddled society. It simply perpetuated it 
under another name. Still today, some Westernized Somalis who often call 
themselves “Somali intellectuals” pretend that clan is a thing of the past.
More generally, Somalis have had no difficulty in coming to terms 
with the modern world materially and technologically. But there is 
continuing problem in finding forms of political organisation which 
are readily compatible with these traditional clan loyalties and their 
extremely decentralised methods of decision-making, through long-
drawn out debate in which all adult males have a right to participate 
directly. Such extreme local democracy does not combine easily with central 
authority.50
Thus clan loyalties remain fundamental and pervasive. People rely on their 
clansmen, for support at all times and especially in contexts of clan competi-
tion for resources, power, and material well-being. They are expected to be 
equally loyal in return, which can translate into clan nepotism where those in 
positions of authority favour their own clansmen. These allegiances often have 
a formal legal basis in Somali customary law. The security of the individual’s 
person and property is guaranteed by collective compensation arrangements, 
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within each clan. Accidental or violent death and injury are thus clan matters 
and kinship provides insurance cover [emphasis added].51
In addition to being what anthropologists call a “descent group” in 
virtue of its members’ collective descent from a common ancestor, what 
then is a clan? Clan genealogies are a source of pride, and members of 
the clan have a lively sense of clan superiority and distinctiveness 
and potential hostility towards those who do not share their descent. 
Members of other clans are regarded as outsiders and viewed with 
suspicion, although these feelings may be muted in the case of clans 
which, through common descent, belong to the same “clan-family” (as 
defined above). Clan loyalties are also regularly supplemented by ties 
based on marriage—with the wife’s clansmen and those of the mother.
Obviously each clan has its own independent history and traditions, its 
own saints and shrines and their cult, and sometimes speaks a differ-
ent dialect of Somali [Italics added]. Language difference is most acute 
in the case of that between the speech of the Digil/Rahanweyn clans 
and so-called “standard Somali” spoken by the other clan-families. 
Here the difference is roughly similar to that between Spanish and 
Portuguese. The names of individuals also vary somewhat on a clan 
basis: it is sometimes possible to guess a person’s clan from his name,52 
although this is by no means always possible.
I do not think that it is generally possible, as some Somalis say it is, 
to distinguish visually between members of different clans. I would 
prefer to say that clans represent invisible lines of distinction within the 
Somali “nation” and since they are based on genealogies and descent, 
have a biological basis comparable to racial distinctions [Italics added]. 
Somalis certainly see them in this light. It may seem paradoxical, but 
invisibility does not detract from their many-stranded and compelling 
importance in economic, social and political life. I have never encoun-
tered any Somali organisation where the clan identity of members was 
not well-known and considered of crucial significance.53
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be added that Somalis are not 
automatons. Clan and other kinship ties are manipulated by ambitious 
individuals whose goal is personal success in material gain of power, 
and as elsewhere, money is a very important lubricant in transactions 
of every kind. Some successful entrepreneurs and politicians are prob-
ably quite cynical (privately) about their clan heritage which they seek 
to use for their own ends, and a few exceptional individuals transcend 
their clan identity. There are certainly some genuine Somali national-
ists, and a few thoroughly Westernised, highly sophisticated, Somali 
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academics and writers who reject their clan background.54 Ironically, 
however, even such unusual figures are nevertheless assumed to be 
motivated by the same clan interests as ordinary Somalis.
Given that the Somali world is fractured into clan-families and com-
ponent clans, any organisation which aspires to representative cred-
ibility must patiently display a balance of clan-family members which 
roughly corresponds to that of its public. It must also be firmly admin-
istered, with powerful constraints, which eliminate clan bias. This is 
well understood by Somalis who assume that every Somali is a clan 
partisan and that there are in principle no neutral Somalis.55 These 
considerations regarding clan partiality apply particularly strongly in 
times of clan conflict and political uncertainty, when people are espe-
cially sensitive to their clan identities, as in the present state of affairs 
in Somalia.
I hope these comments on the nature of Somali clanship, as I see it 
as a professional Social Anthropologist, are of assistance to you.
Yours sincerely,
Ioan M. Lewis FBA
Professor of Anthropology
VIII. Samatar’s Response to Lewis’s First Submission
Samatar argues that Somali genealogical groups are the same ethnic and racial 
group. His thesis is that Somali identity is more complex than genealogy. The 
key distinction he makes is between genealogical heritage and clan politics. 
He accepts the importance of genealogy but argues that if it were the only 
item needed to define a Somali’s identity, then other constituent elements of 
Somalis’ social and cultural repertoire would not have developed. Thus, he 
maintains that the key ingredients that defined traditional Somali identity 
was shared language, culture, religion, and means of livelihood, in addition to 
genealogy. Genealogy was one of these ingredients, and its role was dependent 
on context. Furthermore, he notes that social and cultural variation among 
Somalis is regional rather than genealogical.
June 30, 2001
Dear Ms. Youngson:
I am responding to your questions regarding the racial and ethnic 
nature of Somali clans. Given my first-hand knowledge of Somali soci-
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ety and my academic credentials, I believe I am qualified to answer 
your questions.
Currently, I am a Professor at the University of Minnesota’s Depart-
ment of Geography in the United States. I have taught Human Geog-
raphy and Somali issues since 1985. A Somali by birth, I grew up in 
northern Somalia, and thus am a native speaker of the Somali lan-
guage and have known intimately Somali culture. I have also done 
comparative work on similar traditional societies, such as Botswana. 
I also worked as a senior researcher at the Human Sciences Research 
Council in Pretoria, South Africa. One of my recent books, An African 
Miracle was a finalist for the 1999 African Studies Association’s Her-
skovits Award, which is given to the most important Africanist book 
published in English. At this moment, I am working on a book examin-
ing leadership and political fragmentation in Somalia and serve as an 
elected director for North America’s premier scholarly association on 
Africa, the African Studies Association.
With regard to offering expert testimony, I have acted as an expert 
witness in numerous United States immigration court cases dealing 
with Somalis and one recent Federal court case. I was a consultant to 
the Canadian Immigration service as well. It should be noted that my 
first book, published by the University of Wisconsin press in 1989, 
predicted the collapse of Somali political order two years before that 
became a reality. This was the only prediction of its kind made by any 
scholar of Somali society.
The two fundamental questions you asked me to answer are:
1.  Do Somali clans belong to different races?
2.  Do they constitute different ethnic groups?
The short answer to both questions is no. Let me elaborate. I start 
with two quotes, one from a poet and one from a farmer, who lived 
in different regions of the country. Farmers, pastoralists and poets are 
doyens of Somali culture, and their understandings of their tradition 
and identity mark the historical basis of my answer to your questions. 
With characteristic prescience, the late Abdillahi Sultan Timaade, the 
most analytical poet in post-colonial Somali history, underscored the 
elevation of innocuous social difference and the social cost of fraudu-
lent ambitions:
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Members of parliament when we assembled them in one place,
Presidents and ministers when they were elected,
Healthy minds and people we were facing the same direction,
Then came those who confused us only to milk everything for their sole 
benefit,
Never to lose an electoral seat whose only intention it was,
In our rural areas they put a knife in every hand,
Those hacks who bombarded us with fake wailings of sectarian solidar-
ity [read clanism],
The poison they injected in us killed nobility of character,
Lies and lies they garland us with, Beware. (1968)
A farmer from the southern town of Jowhar reinvoked Timaade’s 
poetic explications nearly two decades later: “Son, the tribalism busi-
ness is the work of the urban people. They cook it there and then serve 
it to us.” (Issa, Spring 1990)
These poetic and pedestrian renderings show that the “clanist” pol-
itics that bedevil Somalia is not rooted in the society’s culture and 
traditions. These two views dovetail with my own formal and infor-
mal education about the nature of Somali culture and genealogy. As 
a schoolboy, I was taught (using British textbooks) that Somalis are 
members of the Cushitic race in the Horn of Africa. I also learned from 
those same textbooks that Somalis are a homogenous ethnic group that 
speak the same language, and practice the same culture and religion. 
Some scholars have referred to Somalia as Africa’s only nation-state 
due to the above characteristics. Nearly all of these scholars exagger-
ated Somali’s homogeneity by overlooking the existence of significant 
communities in the south of the country who have different histories 
and social organizations. Despite such variations, the vast majority of 
the people in the country share the same fundamental social, cultural 
and religious values that defined the nature of traditional Somali iden-
tity: Islam, Somali language, genealogy, oral and poetic literature, Xeer 
(customary law), and sharing material risks. Collectively, these traits 
bounded Somali identity.
Genealogical “groups” (clans) range in size from an extended fam-
ily to a collection of these at the regional and national levels. Thus, 
the numbers of genealogical groups and sub-groups are contingently 
defined and not determined a priori. Genealogically speaking, Somalis 
can be divided into several “major” and “minor” groups. The desig-
nation “major-minor” is not based on any accurate national census. 
Somali genealogical groups share Somali identity and origin. Given 
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the high level of inter-marriage within and among different groups—a 
characteristic feature of this culture—there are no visible and invisible 
biological differences among Somalis.
Somali genealogies embedded in that old tradition, which was 
grounded in inclusive shared values, must not be conflated with the 
instrumentally induced recent political practice and concept—clanism. 
This practice was invented by competing elite factions in their struggle 
to illegitimately privatise public resources, including political power. 
Clanism therefore is bereft of tradition. What seems to give clanism an 
authentic hue is its organisational structure that mirrors genealogical 
patterns. However, clanism is genealogy expunged from its cultural 
moorings and hitched onto an opportunistic and divisive political 
game.
According to the British Race Relations Act of 1976, two essential 
characteristics define an ethnic group: i) It had to have a long shared 
history, of which the group was conscious as distinguishing it from 
other groups, and the memory of which it kept alive, and ii) It had to 
have a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social cus-
toms and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious 
observances.
Other characteristics that could be relevant are: i) either a common 
geographical origin or descent from a smaller number of common 
ancestors; ii) a common language, which did not have to be peculiar to 
the group, iii) a common literature peculiar to the group, iv) a common 
religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general 
community surrounding it, and v) the characteristic of being a minor-
ity or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a larger com-
munity. Having considered the essential and possibly relevant features 
of the Act, I conclude the following about the social nature of Somali 
genealogical groups: i) Each Somali genealogical group does not have 
distinct history that distinguishes it from other Somalis. There has 
been unsuccessful recent attempts to manufacture such history in the 
context of instrumentalist and sectarian elite politics; ii) Each Somali 
genealogical family lacks its unique cultural tradition, customs, man-
ners, etc. For example, the town of Gabileh where I grew up is home 
to several communities of differing “male” genealogies, but none has 
a unique history. It is possible to write the history for the town and 
its vicinity but not a unique cultural and distinct tradition of each 
genealogical group. This equally applies to all Somali groups with the 
exception of two groups, one in the south, and a minority group in the 
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entire country; and iii) finally, there is no scientific and biological basis to 
demarcate genealogical groups as a race. There are of course localized 
and family histories among Somalis, just like all other human commu-
nities. However, none of the so-called major genealogical groups have 
the unique characteristics so defined by the Race Relations Act of 1976. 
Furthermore, Somali genealogical groups, large or small, do not satisfy 
four of the five secondary but relevant features noted in the Race Rela-
tions Act. There is a Somali-wide language, literature, religious and 
cultural practices. Some analysts who have superficial knowledge or 
understanding of Somali culture and politics fail to grasp the mate-
rial and ideological make-up of that society’s current political prob-
lems. They confound genealogy with elite driven sectarian politics that 
pit one group against others. If genealogy was the lethal (patriarchal 
blood driven) impulse then my mother should have rejected my father 
and my siblings since, according to the said custom, we are members 
of the potential enemy. This type of superficial analysis imputes cau-
sality to genealogy and tradition. Clanism, as the political mechanism 
for manipulating community sentiment along sectarian lines, is the 
force behind the Somali calamity. Genealogical differences have been 
one of the elements of Somali tradition, but it never induced the kind 
of mayhem that mars this society. I have recently written about this in 
two British Journals (1997, 2001). The clan centered misrepresentation 
of the dynamics of Somali culture and politics leads to the invention of 
racial and ethnic categories that have no bearing on Somali social his-
tory. Such concocted categories best serve sectarian entrepreneurs that 
profit from un-civic manipulations of normal but benign human dif-
ferences. The features which the British Race Relations Act prescribes 
are those which separate the Somali from their neighbours, such as 
the Oromo and Afar (groups found in Djibouti and Ethiopia). The 1976 
Act’s definition of race and ethnic groups does not apply to the vast majority 
of Somalis.
I hope these remarks directly answer the questions. Please let me 
know if you need more information on the subject.
Sincerely,
Abdi I. Samatar
Professor of Geography
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IX. Lewis’s Rebuttal
Lewis’s and Samatar’s second and third submissions include discussion of 
contributions made by some of the applicants and the respondent (Garaad). 
Lewis’s response to Samatar’s criticism of his first submission and Garaad’s 
contribution has these points. First, Lewis tries to undermine Samatar’s aca-
demic credibility by pointing out that geographers are not experts on identity 
and genealogical systems. He is able to dismiss geographers’ contributions 
by reducing identity to clan and depriving Somalis of their multi-faceted and 
dynamic history. He adds that Samatar has not conducted research in rural 
Somalia that is relevant to issues of identity and polity as he has defined them. 
Second, Lewis reiterates his claim that Somalis like Samatar are Westernized 
and therefore do not understand their society and culture. Third, he introduces 
his accusation that the BBC Somali Service’s news and programs are strongly 
biased against certain regions and groups. He claims that recent hires have 
upset clan balance in the Somali Service. Lewis intends to implicate Garaad, 
the head of the service, as someone who was already guilty of professional mal-
feasance and lacked any integrity. Fourth, Lewis explicitly accuses Garaad of 
supporting Abdiqasim S. Hassan, the president of the Transitional National 
Government, without producing any evidence other than the fact that the two 
belong to the same genealogical group. Here again Lewis implies the inability 
of Somalis to behave professionally when such behavior affects any member of 
their genealogical group.56
22/07/01
Dear Mr. Hanley:
Following the draft version sent by fax yesterday, I now write to give 
you my comments on the contributions of Prof. Samatar and Mr. Yusuf 
Gerad in the BBC Somali case. I don’t think they are very impressive 
for the reasons indicated. In fact, they appear surprisingly hastily writ-
ten and superficial. It is not surprising that Prof. Samatar should have 
been approached (although he is not, in my opinion, particularly well 
qualified). He is a friend of Mr. Yusuf Gerad and like him a protagonist for 
the “Arta faction,” or “national transitional government” as it calls itself. I 
think you are aware that Mr. Yusuf Gerad and “President” Abdulqasim belong 
to the same section of the Habar Ghedir clan. As you also know, I think, the 
BBC has been inundated with complaints from Somalis throughout 
the world on the obvious bias which its news reports, particularly on 
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the Somali Service, display in their treatment of events in Somalia. I 
think these complaints are fully justified and (as I have conveyed to the 
BBC management and FCO) I share the view that the BBC no longer 
provides impartial reporting on Somali issues. Other Somali special-
ists who share my concern for the well-being of the Somali Service 
have similarly made representations to the BBC—without much effect. 
The obvious conclusion seems to be that the BBC management relies 
unquestioningly on Mr. Yusuf Gerad to form their views on Somalia. 
In view of his obvious lack of impartiality, this seems rather unwise.
1. Prof Samatar
Prof. Samatar describes himself as a Geographer. Geography is, of 
course, a broad subject, but in my fifty years of university research and 
teaching I have never encountered a Geographer who was expert in 
the complexities of African systems of kinship and clanship which are, 
as it were, bread and butter to the professional Social Anthropologist.57 
Having reviewed, either in their manuscript or published versions, 
most of Professor Samatar’s Somali writings, I know of nothing to sug-
gest that he has the technical expertise to master this highly specialised 
field. Nor, as far as I know, has Prof. Samatar carried out the extensive, 
systematic field research in rural Somali society on this topic which 
would provide the necessary raw data for such an analysis. Thus, for 
example, while he asserts that modern Somali clan behaviour, which he 
calls “clanism,” is a new untraditional development he has offered no 
satisfactory empirical evidence to sustain this argument. Nevertheless, 
clan loyalties in the modern context may indeed be more outrageously 
exploited by the westernised political elite than by the clan elders in 
earlier times. If so, this increases rather than diminishes the similarity 
of contemporary Somali clanship with more familiar examples of man-
ufactured ethnic and “racial” identity in, for example, the Balkans.
As a Somali, however, Professor Samatar naturally has direct personal 
experience of Somali culture and social organisation which informs his writ-
ing. His position in this respect is similar to that of any other member of 
the westernised Somali elite,58 as for example, Mr. Yusuf Gerad or the 
BBC Applicants (one of whom, Mr. M.H. Sheikh, is as it happens, 
a professionally trained social anthropologist and therefore pos-
sesses specialised knowledge of Somali clanship). It should perhaps 
be emphasised, here, that while being a Somali necessarily gives one 
direct, personal experience of Somali kinship and clanship, this is not 
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the same as an objective analytical understanding based on systematic 
anthropological (or sociological) research.
Coming from a non-Somali, this may sound rather arrogant. But the 
point I seek to make can perhaps be made clearer if I say that, as a Brit-
ish citizen, I have inevitably some direct experience of the British class 
system. This, however, does not constitute a sound basis for claiming 
that I am in any sense an expert on the subject. And, in fact, I would be 
the first to acknowledge that I know little in a technical sense about 
this topic. The fact of being British here is, in itself, thus scarcely a basis 
for speaking authoritatively on “class.”
Having said all that, I agree with Prof. Samatar when he says that 
Somali clans do not belong to different races. This is true in a scien-
tific, biological sense. However, it is actually irrelevant, and misses the 
whole point of the issues in racial (and inter-ethnic) relations gener-
ally. Race and inter-ethnic relations are not based on the actual genetic 
make-up of those concerned. They are a matter of subjective ideas that 
the protagonists involved hold about their identity, and their difference 
from others. They are based on ideas in the mind, implanted by cul-
ture, and do not run in the blood whatever those who hold them may 
think. For conduct to qualify as “racist” or informed by ethnicity, it has 
to be based on ideas and theories about the nature and significance of 
social differences which, although they have no basis in scientific real-
ity, nevertheless powerfully motivate individual loyalty. The presump-
tion, which Somalis manifestly hold, that those who share the same 
genealogy and belong to the same “clan” (or “sub-clan”) should sup-
port each other at all times, and resort to nepotism utilising every pos-
sible connection for the benefit of their own clansmen at the expense 
of members of other clans, is on a par with racism and ethnicity else-
where. The guiding principle here is “my clansmen right or wrong.” This 
I take it, is the allegation being advanced in this case against Mr. Yusuf 
Gerad by the Applicants. That in their cultural universe this is how 
they conceptualise it, this does not mean, of course, that Somalis are 
actually genetically programmed to operate in this way. In other contexts, 
prominent differences in physical features assist group stereotyping in 
an obvious way, but they are not its essential basis. The basis always 
lies in the feelings and assumptions which we hold about our own 
identity and that of others, about our cultural theory of social relation-
ships and political allegiances. Culture is here dominant, not biology, 
even if as they are among the Somali, biological models (or idioms) of 
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identity and behaviour (such as “clans”) are utilised to organise social 
and political relations.
At some unknown point in history, the ancestors of the present Somali 
people evidently decided to organise their social and political life on a basis of 
family trees tracing descent in the male line. The earliest written accounts 
of the Somalis we possess refer to this form of organisation. What in 
other cultures is often simply a matter of family history is here much 
more important since it constitutes the basis of social and political 
identity. These Somali genealogies do not simply tell you where I come 
from; much more significantly, they tell you who I am and how I relate 
to others.
As I have tried to explain in my submission and reiterate above, 
Somalis treat these genealogical distinctions like species or genus dis-
tinctions in nature, and regard them in short as natural divisions with 
the biological basis expressed in their genealogies.
That they are not actually all biologically different in a scientific 
sense is irrelevant, since their society is organised on the assumption 
that this is the case. In the comparative sociological study of race and 
ethnic relations, we always have to remember that actual genetics do 
not matter, what matters is how people conceive of themselves and 
others. Social (i.e. ideological) biology (rather than actual scientific 
biology) is the issue here as elsewhere in race relations. From what he 
writes, it would appear that Prof. Samatar does not understand this 
distinction between cultural theory and scientific fact.
Interestingly, Prof. Samatar also cites the fact that his mother and 
father belonged to different genealogical groups as evidence that clan 
and lineage identity is neutral. This is a puzzling observation. Those 
who study Somali and other similar clan systems professionally, know 
that intermarriage (marital alliance) between distinct, and potentially 
hostile, groups is one of the oldest strategies utilised in kinship systems 
of this type to generate important compensating alliances. These mari-
tal connections are relied upon to facilitate inter-clan and inter-sub-
clan relations. This is old hat in the anthropological study of Somali 
kinship. And, as has been well-documented by Somali social anthro-
pological research, these affinal ties have been widely used in this 
familiar fashion in recent peace-making moves in Somaliland. In some 
cultures, although I have not myself heard this said by Somalis, reflect-
ing this practice people even say explicitly “We marry our enemies.”
I. M. Lewis FBA
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X. Samatar’s Final Response to Lewis
Samatar’s final written response systematically takes on Lewis’s accusations 
and contentions. First, Samatar challenges Lewis to produce evidence sub-
stantiating the allegation that he is a friend of Garaad.59 Lewis’s intention 
was to impress upon the judges that Somalis are unable to conduct themselves 
professionally, as they lie to unjustly support not only their “clansmen” but 
also their friends (note the equation between clansmen and friends). Thus, 
Samatar is Westernized, in Lewis’s view, but still behaves like Lewis’s Somali 
prototype—to support his presumed friend, Mr. Garaad. Second, Samatar 
attempts to show how outdated Lewis’s reading of identity is by referring to 
developments in social sciences and humanities over the past three decades. 
Third, the response underscores Lewis’s bias in writing about phases of Somali 
history and culture, intending to show that Lewis is indeed the Westerner who 
has studied Somali culture and identity through Western and colonial lenses. 
Samatar and the BBC legal team decided not to expose the serious contradic-
tions between Lewis’s earlier writings about Somalis and his more recent ones 
until the court cross-examination; this strategy would prove very effective 
when the BBC’s lawyer cross-examined Lewis during court proceedings.
September 5, 2001
Dear Ms. Youngson:
It is not the first time that Professor Lewis has resorted to name-call-
ing rather than engaging scholars who disagree with his ideas. For 
example, he calls me a “westernized Somali, a friend of Yususf Garaad, 
and supporter of TNG.” Such remarks add nothing, particularly when 
they are false, to the expert discussion of Somali issues.
Professor Lewis’s tendency to use superficial analysis invariably 
results in the wrong conclusions and observations. A wonderful exam-
ple of this is his characterization of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. 
While most Somalis and scholars of Africa would consider him to 
be Somalia’s premier freedom fighter against colonialism,60 Professor 
Lewis exposes his historical blinders by writing:
Nearly 80 years ago, a brave servant of the empire called Richard Corfield 
tried to bring order to the Somalis, when they were in rebellion under 
a religious leader dubbed the Mad Mullah by the British. All Corfield got of 
his pains was a bullet in the head in battle and a place in the epic poetry 
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of Somalia—a bloodthirsty hymn to victory that has lived on in a society 
steeped in antagonism to outsiders.* The first thing to underscore about the 
Somalis is that they are not as other men.61 [Italics added.]
(*Ironically, Lewis contradicts himself about the attitude of 
Somalis to outsiders, as he observed in an earlier writing that, 
“Although the republic [Somalia] can as yet boast no counterpart 
to the excellent Institute of Ethiopian Studies at Addis Ababa, 
there can be few countries where the foreign researcher is more 
welcome or given greater freedom to carry out his work without let or 
hindrance.”62)
Is Somalia really a society that became “steeped in antagonism to 
outsiders?” If so, how did this qualitative transformation occur? Such 
a stereotypical statement cannot be a substitute for a careful and his-
torically grounded analysis. Unfortunately, such unsubstantiated state-
ments have been the trademark of some of Professor Lewis’s work.
Let me turn to Professor Lewis’s six major assertions in his third 
submission:
1.  He claims that I am a friend of Mr. Yusuf Garaad. Professor Lewis 
has no knowledge of my private life and I would like him to provide 
the evidence necessary to substantiate this declaration. As Lewis 
provides no other corollary to this assertion and its supposed value, 
I can only assume he is making this reference to friendship to dis-
credit my professional credibility.
2.  Professor Lewis indicates that he knows of no geographer who is an 
expert on African kinship and clanship. Lewis’s difficulty, as always, 
is that he confuses and equates politics and identity formation with 
genealogical structures. His genealogy-based thesis is mechanically 
deterministic and permits little leeway for human agency and social 
change. In other words, his stance implies that one does not need 
to study the dynamics of a society and its larger context to bet-
ter understand the shifting nature of politics. For Lewis, genealogy 
alone is enough.
Scholarly literature in the last three decades has convincingly 
shown the bankruptcy of this approach.63 The issue at hand is 
the politics of identity formation, and this has been the epicenter 
of debates in the social sciences and humanities for the last two 
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decades. Geographers have contributed to this subject in no small 
way (see various issues of the journal Political Geography). Lewis’s 
submission indicates that he is not aware of these developments 
or by his silence refuses to give them credence. The first possibility 
offers the unsettling picture of a scholar no longer engaged with 
ideas. The second possibility is just as unpalatable.
Out-dated anthropological literature on “traditional” genealogy 
no longer provides the appropriate framework for understanding 
identity politics in contemporary Somalia and Africa. Historians, 
political scientists, geographers and even anthropologists use a vari-
ety of theoretical tools to explain the dynamics of identity formation. 
Political economy and social theory are two of the conceptual tools 
scholars have used in recent decades. Events in the last decade have 
sustained the validity of my approach to Somali Studies. My first 
major publication (1989) predicted the watershed EVENT in con-
temporary Somali political history: the disintegration of the Somali 
state. Professor Lewis failed to anticipate this historic benchmark 
due to the serious limitations of his approach to Somali Studies.
3.  Professor Lewis asserts that I have not done extensive systematic 
field research in rural Somali society on this topic. It is true that I 
did not focus my attention on genealogy and clans in my fieldwork. 
However, I have done more extensive fieldwork on Somalia’s rural 
economy and national political economy than Lewis did in his entire 
career (see his CV for field visits). Lewis’s last significant fieldwork 
(3 months) took place nearly thirty years ago. Studying rural society 
in the context of a vastly changing world is substantially more com-
plex than choreographing the structure of genealogy.
4.  Professor Lewis indicates that although I have direct personal expe-
rience of Somali culture, I lack the expertise. He then goes on to 
accuse me of being westernized—the implication of which he does 
not make explicit. Extrapolating from his stance, given the fact that 
Professor Lewis hails from the Western world, would it not also be 
appropriate to say that his perspective is “westernized?” Whatever 
Lewis’s intentions are in such name-calling, the reality is that he 
cannot match my grasp of Somali culture, poetry, and politics.
Despite the years Professor Lewis has spent studying Somali 
society, this effort has been conducted indirectly, through translators and 
English-speaking Somalis [Italics added]. I believe that fluency in the 
Somali language is an important indicator of Lewis’ capacity to be a 
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seasoned analyst of Somali culture, identity and politics. Moreover, 
Professor Lewis also argues that my understanding of Somali cul-
ture and identity is akin to his lay person’s knowledge of the British 
class system. This is the height of arrogance. I have been a student of 
Somali political economy for nearly 17 years. In contrast, Lewis has 
not studied British society and hence the comparison is at best irrel-
evant. Finally, no competent scholar of the British class system will 
take seriously someone who has not engaged in serious fieldwork 
on the subject for nearly three decades.
In the end, the tragedy of Professor Lewis’s submission and his 
current stance is that it exposes him as a scholar on Somalia that 
has lived off the contribution of a small endowment to the knowl-
edge base of Somali Studies made at a time when there was a pau-
city of highly trained social scientists. The conditions have changed 
in the last two decades, as more Somali and non-Somali scholars 
on Somalia have emerged. Consequently, the knowledge base of 
Somali Studies and African Studies has expanded. It is inevitable, 
then, as understanding and greater insight emerged, Lewis’s words 
would no longer be the ruling ideas. It is also not surprising that this 
turn of events would result in Professor Lewis demonstrating great 
discomfort with the growing challenge younger scholars pose, as I 
believe his submission reflects.
5.  Professor Lewis’s first and third submissions are contradictory. He 
argued in the first submission that “I would prefer to say that clans 
represent invisible lines of distinction within the Somali ‘nation’ 
and, since they are based on genealogies and descent, have a biologi-
cal basis comparable to racial distinctions (emphasis added).” Professor 
Lewis changes his view in the third submission and reverts to a 
social constructionist approach to race and ethnic issues—a position 
I made clear in my second testimony and before I had access to Pro-
fessor Lewis’s third submission.
Finally, my brief is to provide a scholarly comment on “whether 
Somali genealogy and identity forms fall within the purview of the 
British Race Relations Act of 1976” and not on the validity of the 
court case. Professor Lewis’s comments indicate that he is a partisan 
in the case. He seems eager to render judgment without the benefit 
of due process. While Professor Lewis’s understanding of Somali 
politics and identity may pass as an expert opinion in the eyes of 
those who are unfamiliar with Somali society, rigorous and objec-
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tive analysis would show that his understanding of this society is 
quite rudimentary for someone who was in the field for so long. His 
assertion that I do not understand the distinction between cultural 
theory and scientific fact is nonsense. The source of confusion is his 
notion that genealogy is the constant in Somali culture and politics, 
and by association Somali identity.
6.  Professor Lewis is unable to grasp the significance of inter-mar-
riage relations between individuals of various Somali genealogi-
cal groups as a social strategy that is a central part of the complex 
process of identity formation in the Somali society, e.g., the exam-
ple of my mother and father, who hail from different genealogi-
cal groups. Contrary to Lewis’s claim, I never heard of the notion 
that my mother was “marrying the enemy.” I asked my 80-year-old 
mother about this notion last week (late August 2001) when I was in 
Somalia and she ridiculed the idea.
Inter-marriage between different genealogical groups has been a 
characteristic feature of Somali communities and where I grew up. 
Members of these communities did not see such unions as a way of 
containing latent and inherent animosities, but as a means of devel-
oping wide ranging social networks that they could tap on for dif-
ferent occasions. Professor Lewis confuses a small number of high 
profile cases, where marriages were consummated to reduce con-
flict. These cases are more the exception rather than the rule. Most 
inter-marriages are products of the mundane demands of everyday 
life and the desires of individuals. Professor Lewis’s misreading is 
the consequence of his approach that is akin to an equation with a 
single variable: genealogy.
In conclusion, I believe it is important to remember that a scholar 
is someone who analytically examines the information and data col-
lected, constantly questioning the validity of the assumptions made in 
the analysis and testing the credibility of existing and new theories that 
have been offered as explanation for a particular reality or result. This 
basic tenet of scholarship has eluded Professor Lewis’s work on Somali 
politics and identity. It is why he continues to use the outmoded the-
ory of genealogy to explain current realities and why his conclusions, 
therefore, are superficial and erroneous.
Sincerely,
Abdi I. Samatar
Abdi Ismail Samatar
67
XI. The Lawyers’ Final Representations
At the tribunal proceedings, the applicants’ and respondents’ lawyers 
adopted the same strategy: to undermine the credibility of each expert 
witness’s testimony. The BBC’s attorney, Mr. Gerard Clarke, focused on 
two major areas of Lewis’s presentation. First, he attempted to show 
that Lewis’s earlier scholarship diametrically contradicted his court 
testimony and his recent polemical works. He cited Lewis’s 1981 (1993) 
publication dealing with the ethnic character of Somalis: “With a total 
population of some five million, the Somali form a single ethnic unit in 
the Horn of Africa…”64 He also quoted from Lewis’s 1988 re-publica-
tion of A Modern History of Somalia:
While the Somali draw many of their distinctive characteristics, espe-
cially their strong egalitarianism, their political acumen and opportun-
ism, and their fierce traditional pride and contempt for other nations 
from their own traditional culture, they also owe much to Islam. And 
it is typical of their mutual dependence upon those two founts of their 
culture that the highly pragmatic view of life which nomadism seems 
to foster…Above all, Islam adds depth and coherence to these common 
elements of traditional culture which, over and above their many sec-
tional divisions, unite Somalis and provide the basis for their national 
consciousness. Although the Somali did not traditionally form a unitary 
state, it is this heritage of cultural nationalism which, strengthened by 
Islam, lies behind Somali nationalism today.65
Mr. Clarke was able, through cross-examination, to force Lewis to 
admit that stark contradictions existed between his most recent claims 
and the work he produced for most of his academic career prior to 
the mid-1980s. Clarke’s second strategy was to show the court that 
Lewis was not just an expert on the Somali clan system but an active 
partisan in the BBC case. Lewis’s petitions to BBC authorities, accus-
ing Garaad of favoring reports from the south and marginalizing the 
north in the Somali Section’s news, were made available to the court. 
Clarke’s extensive and aggressive cross-examination exposed the great 
pains Lewis had taken to cover up his partisan involvement in the case. 
Third, the respondents’ lawyer used Lewis’s own early works to show 
that Somalis are a single ethnic group. At the end, Lewis’s last refuge 
was to argue that Somali genealogical groups belong to different races. 
The BBC’s lawyers felt so confident after the first three hours of cross-
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examination that they privately suggested to the applicants’ attorneys 
that they withdraw the case, which the applicants’ lawyers rejected.
The applicants’ attorney, Ms. Catrin Lewis (no relation to Profes-
sor Lewis) sought to show that Samatar was not an expert on Somali 
identity (read “clan system”) and that his testimony was dependent on 
his personal experience as a native Somali and on his political orienta-
tion. Ms. Lewis noted that Samatar was not a “typical Somali” and that 
“by refusing to use the word ‘clan,’ he was trying to deny it. This was 
something no Somali could do.” This was of course the classic colonial 
approach: to delegitimize independent-minded local people who do 
not accept terminology imposed by others. Neither of the two Lewises 
tried to locate contradictions in Samatar’s scholarship during the cross-
examination. More critically, the judges noted the illogic of their claims 
that Samatar’s testimony was simultaneously based on native/personal 
experience and that, at the same time, he is too Westernized to assess 
the clan system appropriately.
What follows is an abbreviated verbatim reproduction of the two 
lawyers’ final submissions. That of Ms. Lewis, the applicants’ lawyer, 
follows Mr. Clarke’s presentation. Both lawyers begin their presenta-
tions by reviewing the pertinent section 3(1) of the British Race Rela-
tions Act (RRA).
XII. Mr. Clarke’s Submission
MOHAMMED SHEIKH and others
and BBC SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RESPONDENT
1.  Discrimination on “racial grounds” means discrimination on 
grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origin: 
RRA section 3(1).
2.  In the present case we can discount colour, nationality and national 
origin as possible bases for discrimination claims. The Applicants 
must show that each clan (and each sub-clan and each sub-sub 
clan, and so on) is a separate race or a separate ethnic group. The 
concept of an ethnic group is explained in Mandla v. Dowell Lee 
[1983] IRLR 209.
3.  For a group to constitute an ethnic group for the purposes of the 
Race Relations Act, it must regard itself, and be regarded by oth-
ers, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics. 
It is essential that there is (1) a long shared history, of which the 
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group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the 
memory of which keeps it alive; (2) a cultural tradition of its own, 
including family and social customs and manners, often but not 
necessarily associated with religious observance. In addition, there 
are other relevant characteristics, one or more of which will com-
monly be found and will help to distinguish the group from the 
secondary community; (3) either a common geographical origin 
or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (4) a com-
mon language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common 
literature peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different 
from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community 
surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a 
dominant group within a larger community.
4.  In the light of the evidence, it is not at all clear how the Appli-
cants can even attempt to bring themselves within any applicable 
category under section 3(1). When the case began it looked as 
though the Applicants were contending that the clans are distinct 
ethnic groups, on the basis of diverse cultural identities, but their 
own expert disavowed this proposition. That he did so is perhaps 
unsurprising in the light of his own writings, which emphasise the 
homogeneous nature of Somali culture and the strong sense of a 
distinct Somali nationality and cultural tradition
5.  The evidence given by Professor Lewis was in many ways unsat-
isfactory: His reports for the purposes of this case are contradic-
tory to his earlier writings. The contradiction may be explained by 
Professor Lewis having taken a partisan position on the underly-
ing subject matter of this litigation. He accepts the Applicants’ 
contention that appointments to BBC positions have been made on 
a clan basis. That alone ought to disqualify him from acting as an 
independent expert in this case, and substantially devalues his evi-
dence.
6.  Most strikingly, Professor Lewis said that “outsiders cannot see 
clans.” The Applicants confirmed this: A Somali person cannot 
tell what clan another Somali person belongs to without asking 
directly or indirectly or making enquiries of others.
7.  This evidence is fatal to a case based on ethic grouping. Mandla v. 
Dowell Lee requires that an ethnic group regard itself and be regarded 
by others as a distinct community.
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8.  The Applicants’ own evidence was remarkable in that it confirmed 
the absence of the cultural upon distinctiveness which they had 
appeared to base their case. They confirmed that variations in, for 
example, language, were regional, that stories varied regionally, 
that camel brands varied from region to region, and even from 
family to family.
9.  It was also apparent that an individual can choose to identify him 
or herself by reference to a clan, sub-clan, sub-sub clan, and so 
on, depending upon the context for which he or she is identifying 
himself. The sub divisions extend, as one of the Applicants said, to 
the “thirtieth generation.”
10.  It is plain from the Applicants’ own evidence that a Somali clan, 
sub clan etc is no more an distinct ethnic group than is a particu-
lar Highland Scottish clan, or Sept. Ultimately, clans are extended 
family groups. Doubtless they have their traditions, but they all 
operate within the broad and generally homogenous Somali cul-
ture.
11. Applying the Mandla v. Dowell Lee criteria:
(1)  clans have shared histories, but these are not distinct to each 
clan: a sub clan or sub-sub clan of, say, the Darod, will have 
part of its history in common with other Darod clans. A sub-sub 
clan will share part of its history with a sub-clan, and so on. The 
sub or sub-sub clans’ distinct history is no more than extended 
family history or genealogy.
(2)  The evidence shows that clans do not have cultural traditions 
of their own. At best, they have family based or regional based 
variations upon wider cultural traditions.
(3)  The clans all come from the geographical region of Somalia. 
They do not come from precisely defined parts of that region. 
Professor Lewis’ maps are conjectural and have no statistical 
basis. Each “top level” clan claims descent from a single com-
mon ancestor, but beyond that, according to Professor Lewis, 
they all claim descent from Arabian ancestors closely associ-
ated with the Prophet Mohammed. Sub clans and sub-sub clans 
share common ancestors with others sub-sets of their main clan 
groupings.
(4)  They all speak the same language, with regional and dialectical 
variations.
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(5) Until recently there was no written literature, but a strong oral 
tradition. The oral tradition is common to Somalis, not clan spe-
cific.
(6) The clans all have the same religion: Islam, which has tradition-
ally operated as a cohesive force in Somali society. No clan claims a 
religion distinct from that of other clans.
(7) None of the clans is an oppressed minority or a dominant 
group. Clan members may oppose one another in political debate 
or political violence, but cross-clan disputes are also common. 
Contemporary Somali politics features members of the same clans 
on opposing factions.
12.  If the Applicants cannot make their case on the basis of ethnic ori-
gin, they are forced to argue that the clans, sub clans etc are sepa-
rate races. This argument is hopeless: the experts agree that there is 
no biological basis for claims by different clans to exist as different 
races.
13.  Professor Lewis attempted to make a case that, despite the absence 
of an objective biological basis for claimed racial identity, it is 
enough that people believe themselves to be racially distinct from 
one another. This is really an argument for a form of culturally 
based ethnicity, in the Mandla v. Dowell Lee sense, but, as set out 
above, the clans fail the Mandla v. Dowell Lee test.
14.  Also, on the basis of this variant of the case, each family which 
claims descent from a particular ancestor belongs to a race distinct 
from that of any other family. The absurdity of this proposition is 
self evident.
15.  Lastly, the Applicants’ own evidence indicated that “clanism” is 
something which has become a prominent force in Somali society 
since the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s. Even if, 
therefore, it is thought that clans have become more distinctive 
and important in recent history, this is not a basis for a finding 
that they are races or ethnic groups. On this, see Crown Suppliers 
v. Dawkins [1993] ICR 517, in which the recency of the emergence 
of Rastafarianism was one of the factors leading to the conclusion 
that Rastafarians did not constitute a distinct ethnic (as opposed to 
religious) group.
16.  The Applicants claims under the RRA should be dismissed.
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Gerard Clarke
Blackstone Chambers
Blackstone House
Temple, London
XIII. Ms. Lewis’s Submission
MOHAMED HAMUD SHEIKH and other Applicants
AND THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Respondent
3.66  The situation of these applicants clearly falls within the mischief 
that the Act is intended to prevent full square. It is a situation where 
it is alleged that one Somali will discriminate against another on 
the grounds of clan membership. This would not however lead to 
a situation where an unsuspecting employer with no knowledge of 
Somali society would fall foul of the Act as it is necessary to have 
the understanding of clan culture or to be from a clan to be able 
to discriminate for your clan or against another. The complaint in 
these applications being that none of the applicants were from the 
Hawiye clan but that all the successful candidates were from that 
clan and that these applicants were not selected because they had 
been discriminated against on the grounds of their clan member-
ship by a member of the Hawiye clan.
Are Somali clans ethnic groups for the purposes of the RRA 1976?
4.  The test under the RRA of whether a group constitutes an ethnic 
group is set out in the case of Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] IRLR 209, 
at 211 paragraph 11.
5.  Somali clans satisfy the first test (1) set out above: each clan has 
its own history in the form of its lineage and with stories relating 
to its own ancestors; each clan member is taught this at his or her 
mother’s knee and the consciousness of being distinct from other 
clans stems from this. There is some overlap between this and hav-
ing a cultural tradition of its own but there is further evidence that 
they satisfy the second test as well, each clan has its own saints 
which are peculiar to that clan and are venerated only by members 
of that clan, with clan members making pilgrimages to their clan 
saints’ shrines and holding ceremonies at which songs of venera-
tion to that particular saint are performed.
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6.  There is also evidence to satisfy some of the other “optional” tests, 
for example (3) and (4), (5) and (7). The clans have their own geo-
graphical regions from which they originate and they descend 
from a particular named common ancestor. The clans have a com-
mon language in that each member of the clan speaks the same 
language, Somali, although this is not a language peculiar to the 
clan. Lord Fraser’s test does not require it to be so.
7.  The clans have their own common oral literature with a body of 
stories, poems and songs celebrating the clan ancestors which is 
peculiar to that clan. All the clans follow Islam and to that extent 
each clan is not different to the other clans around it. The different 
clans may be a minority group or a dominant group depending on 
where a clan member is within the country.
8.  These differences are so obvious and inherent to Somalis that it is 
difficult to describe—but clan identity is all pervasive. It is impos-
sible to understand or analyse Somali society without reference to 
and understanding of Somali clans and their key role unique to 
that society.
13.  In Commission for Racial Equality v. Dutton [1989] IQB 783 the nature 
of the evidence relevant to the question of ethnic group was con-
sidered and it was accepted that gypsies were an ethnic group 
even though some members had given up the distinctive lifestyle.
The Experts
14.  Professor Lewis’s expertise is in the field of anthropology. He is 
a renowned scholar of Somali society and culture, anthropology 
being “the study of mankind, especially of its societies and cus-
toms” (the Concise Oxford Dictionary). Whereas Professor Samatar 
is a professor of geography, “the science of the earth’s surface, 
from, physical features, natural and political divisions, climate, 
productions, population, etc.” (Concise Oxford Dictionary).
15.  Professor Samatar’s observations are purely anecdotal and are 
clearly influenced by his own political perspective. His experience 
of schooling in Somalia is from a time when clans had been buried 
in the name of scientific socialism and also from a time when the 
Somali language had a written form and clan stories were written 
down and disseminated to other clans in schools. This does not 
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mean that those stories do not belong to the particular clans or 
come from that clan‘s particular culture and form part of it.67
16.  Professor Lewis has studied the customs and literature of the dif-
ferent clans and his work pre and post dates the burial of clans and 
the concept of clannism; he was clear that each clan has its own 
stories and poets and its own saints that were venerated. Profes-
sor Lewis was also able to point to the earliest written reference to 
the different Somali clans as dating back to the 16th century. Clan 
identity and its role in Somali society cannot therefore be called a 
modern invention.
17.  Professor Lewis’s deep understanding of Somali society and the 
nature of Somali clans and how they operate within Somali society 
does not mean that he has an axe to grind. In fact he expressed 
himself to be a long standing supporter of the BBC World Ser-
vice and to have campaigned on its behalf. The fact that he has 
expressed his genuine concern at the perceived lack of balance 
in the Somali service does not undermine his independence, but 
rather shows that he has a genuine and independently held view 
as to the nature and role of clans and their importance in Somali 
society.
18.  I would ask you to read the whole of Professor Lewis’s report 
found at pages 14–30 at the bundle and his further report at pages 
56–60 and to accept their contents. In particular at page 20, Appen-
dix 1 to his first report at paragraph 2, sets out key factors that 
address and satisfy the test (1) and (2) identified by Lord Fraser. 
These elements of differentiation are present on a closer examina-
tion of an apparently homogenous society; the term ethnic group 
is not used in a scientific sense in the legislation nor is it a term 
of art. A person can belong to more than one racial group under 
the legislation. The fact that each clan has similar structures and 
organises itself in a way that is similar to other clans (giving an 
overall impression of homogeneity) does not prevent each being 
a different ethnic group under the Act, the question is can the 
group show that it is a separate and distinct community by virtue 
of characteristics which are commonly associated with common 
racial origin (Mandla v. Dowell Lee). Professor Lewis’s description 
of Somali clans being based on their belief or perception of descent 
from a single common ancestor led him to the view that they were 
in fact closer to the definition of race than anything else. This does 
Abdi Ismail Samatar
75
not mean they do not have the necessary characteristics for an eth-
nic group under the Act but, rather, points strongly to clans falling 
under that definition.
19.  Each individual applicant is conscious of him or herself as belong-
ing to their own individual clan and subclan and retains the clan 
history in respect of their own lineage. Professor Lewis, who has 
studied the different clans and their oral traditions, was clear that 
each had their own historical tradition and own specific saints 
particular to that clan as well as there being some free floating 
saints common to all clans. The cult of the clan saint was kept alive 
by veneration and pilgrimage to a shrine of the particular clan’s 
saint. This was supported by the evidence of Mohamed Sheikh, 
Mohamed Dualeh and Mustafa Hussein, who each referred to hav-
ing their own clan saint, and Jawahir Elmi who referred to her 
own clan’s stories and poems. Shamsa Ahmed is from the Shiqal 
clan, which has its own particular tradition due to being consid-
ered to have a special religious role and so is again distinguished 
from other tribes. Each applicant was clear to which ancestor they 
traced their founding line back.
20.  The Somali clans, or clan-families, are identified as Darod, Dir, 
Isaq, Hawiye, Rahanweyn and Digil and each is recognised by each 
other as separate and distinct. A Darod clan member considers him 
or herself to be Darod and not Dir and would be recognised by a 
Dir member as Darod. Within Somali society each person is placed 
by reference to his or her clan membership by their own clan and 
members of other clans and is recognised to belong to the com-
munity of that particular clan family. That they can also trace their 
line down to more immediate ancestors does not detract from this 
identity as the key clan families are recognisable and recognised as 
such within Somali society.
21.  In my submission the applicants’ have shown that they satisfy the 
relevant requirements of an ethnic group on the balance of prob-
abilities and I would ask the tribunal to find in their favour on the 
preliminary issue.
Catrin Lewis
2 Garden Court
Temple
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XIV. The Tribunal’s Decision
The court made its ruling, and two factors informed the tribunal’s deci-
sion. First, Lewis’s lack of objectivity and his partisan involvement in 
the case troubled the judges. In its decision, the tribunal quotes Lewis’s 
own testimony to underscore his prejudice:
As you can readily imagine, with the best will in the world, such con-
nections, in the Somali perception, would make it very difficult for the 
Somali Service to present current Somali news in a completely neutral 
fashion. The situation is compounded by recently reported appoint-
ments to the Somali Section which appear to have altered its clan balance 
in favor of this grouping (Employment Tribunals, London, Case No. 
6000066/02 & others, p. 5).68
The judges underscored their skepticism about Lewis’s impartiality 
by noting that, “we accept Lewis is an eminent authority in the field, 
but the above-quoted remarks do cause us some concern when con-
sidering the objectivity of the evidence.” Second, the tribunal accepted 
Lewis’s tactical agreement, under the pressure of cross-examination, 
that Somali clans do not constitute distinct ethnic groups. However, 
the court found wanting Lewis’s other claim, that Somali genealogical 
groups constitute different racial groups. After carefully examining 
the evidence, the tribunal concluded that Somali clans do not meet 
the requirements of the RRA. The court commented, “in both the two 
essential characteristics we conclude that the applicants fail Lord Fra-
ser’s test. However for the sake of completeness we shall consider 
the other relevant characteristics which he identified.” The tribunal’s 
ultimate conclusion, after examining the Act’s remaining features, was 
this:
[B]ecause of the disparate nature of the Somali clan system, the fact that 
it is constantly watered down by the facility of intermarriage between 
clans, and the failure to satisfy most of the tests laid down by Lord Fra-
ser, we are led to the inevitable conclusion that the Somali clan system is 
not of a sufficient racial flavour to bring it within the express provisions 
or indeed the mischief of the Race Relations Act 1976. The claims of race 
discrimination brought against the respondents are therefore dismissed 
(p. 9).
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After considering all the Act’s features, the arguments, and the evi-
dence presented pertaining to Somali genealogical groups’ ethnic and 
racial nature in the context of the British Race Relations Act 1976, the 
tribunal unambiguously resolved as follows:
The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that ‘the membership of 
clans in Somali society does not amount to membership of a racial or 
ethnic group within the meaning of section 1 and 3 of the Race Relations 
Act 1976. The claims of race discrimination are therefore dismissed in 
respect of all the applicants’ (p. 1).
Once the tribunal rendered its judgment pertaining to the racial and 
ethnic basis of Somali “clans,” it then set a date to examine the remain-
der of the applicants’ claims that their dismissal amounted to “unfair 
and a breach of contract.” Several months later, and after some consid-
eration, the applicants withdrew their case; in exchange, the BBC did 
not demand that the applicants cover its court costs.69
XV. Conclusion: Implications of the Decision
Two major threads run through critiques of certain Western writings 
on the non-Western world. First, in recent years, that literature has 
been accused of being Eurocentric, but others noted as much decades 
ago, as Asad’s epigraph above indicates. Second, revisionist political 
economists have established that the qualities Eurocentric literature 
identified with “traditional societies” are of recent origin. For instance, 
three decades ago Samir Amin’s insightful article established that the 
so-called traditional societies under colonialism were anything but 
traditional.70 Amin made his case by showing how colonial regimes 
restructured and reoriented economies to serve European interests and 
how such transformations distorted those societies’ internal dynamics 
and logic. In a parallel fashion, Mamdani’s recent work has exposed 
how colonialism distorted African cultural traditions and produced 
political identities that nominally mimic the old culture but have essen-
tially turned it inside out. Traditional social anthropological studies of 
Somali society avoided engaging these Africanist ideas, pretending 
that Somalis were a unique breed. As Lewis puts it, “the first thing to 
underscore about the Somalis is that they are not as other men.”71 Some 
perceptive colonial administrators of the former British Somaliland 
doubted some of the main tenets of Lewisan anthropology long before 
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Lewis came to Somalia with the advent of the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Funds. In 1946, Brigadier General T. Fisher, then military 
governor of Shiekh, pointed out the importance of careful analysis and 
warned against imposing “standard” assumptions about tribal societ-
ies on Somalia:
A form of tribal administration would be particularly convenient in Brit-
ish Somaliland; but unfortunately, there are no indigenous institutions 
here, nor are there any recognized leaders through whom authority 
can be exercised. The unit may be said to be the family—if not the indi-
vidual…If a tribal system ever existed in the Protectorate, which is not certain, 
it was destroyed by the Egyptians who preferred direct control communicated 
through Aqils who were government servants rather than tribal representatives, 
to indirect control exercised through native chiefs…What the present gov-
ernment has been trying to do is to establish…some form of organized 
responsibility, within the existing tribal or sectional structures…Parallel 
with this, we have started some native courts, and town committees, 
which are thought to be showing some promise, but they cannot be 
said to be tribal in their composition; while the laws and regulations 
which they administer are our laws and regulations—not indigenous 
ones…Our type of administration requires trained and literate person-
nel…Somalis, though at present illiterate, are extremely quick to learn; 
and when educated, show signs of being able to exercise authority; and 
it is perhaps, be safe to say that that the most influential people in the 
country today are clerks and traders… . It is therefore thought that the 
natural leaders will be found as a product of our schools, rather than 
as elected or self-appointed members of our tribes…We shall therefore 
be well-advised not to try to impose on the Somalis a bogus system of native 
authority, or delude ourselves that such a system can be artificially devised.72
Fisher, despite his patronizing and racist attitude, was sufficiently 
perceptive to capture the distinctions between genealogy and “tribal 
politics,” although the colonial government retained its commitment 
to the latter. He recognized that colonial engineering of tribal politics 
could not work in Somalia, as “traditional” tribal authority did not 
exist in this society. The distinction between genealogy and tribalized 
political authority, which Fisher recognized sixty years ago, has eluded 
the leading Western anthropologist and many others writing on Somali 
society.
Somali cultural and literary analysts have, at least since indepen-
dence, warned about the human and social costs of fraudulent tribal 
politics. Abdillahi Sultan Timaade’s insightful premonition and those 
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of many other Somali cultural leaders, such as Hadrawi, have been 
borne out. Here is an extract from Timaade’s prescient 1968 forecast:
Darajada Ilaahay ninkii doonaya helae
[Those who labour for Allah’s blessing earn it]
Nin ka duday distoorkiyo waxyiga diinti ka carrowye
[Those who stray from the constitution and the divine revelation remain 
outside the faith]
Dugsi male qabyaaled waxay dumiso mooyaane
[Clanist politics provide no solace, it only destroys]
Hadayaan xumaanta iyo dilka daynin kala qaadka
[If we do not terminate this savagery and mend our ways]
Dibaddan ka joogna sharciga dacadda Illahe
[We are beyond Allah’s grace]
Danbarkeedu waa jahanamiyo dogobki naareede
[And its reward is Jahanama, the cruelest purgatory of all]
Rather than engage the wisdom of Somalia’s leading cultural prac-
titioners or Africanist academic analysts by challenging the sectarian 
political tide that engulfed the Somali people, Lewis saw the crisis as 
an opportunity to secure his legacy by imposing his theory on Soma-
lia. As a result, he has tirelessly campaigned to convince international 
donors, particularly the European Union, that his clan-based vision 
for Somalia is the most suitable and realistic plan for reconstructing 
political authority in this society.73 The BBC case seemed a heaven-sent 
opportunity for Lewis to ground his theory in British law, with the 
hope the rest of the world, and particularly Europe, would follow suit. 
His tactics in the case vindicate Asad’s description of anthropology as 
an enterprise “carried out by Europeans, for a European audience of non-
European societies dominated by European power.”74 Lewis’s impudence in 
dismissing Somali scholars and their reading of this society as atavis-
tic, lacking in the objectivity of a European, or as too assimilated and 
Westernized to understand traditional Somali cultural values, confirms 
earlier critiques of social anthropology. The only “real” Somalis are 
those who adhere to Lewis’s master narrative.
What might have been the effects on Somali life if the tribunal’s ver-
dict had been for the applicants and thus sanctioned Lewis’s argument? 
At least four major potential impacts can be discerned. Conceptually, 
the ruling would have reinforced the notion, present in much of the 
literature, that genealogy is politics and that a Somali’s political identity 
is fixed from the day of his or her birth. Second, an affirmative deci-
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sion would have set a critical legal precedent in the United Kingdom, 
and ultimately in the European Union, that Somalis consist of distinct 
ethnic and racial groups. This would have enhanced the credibility of 
sectarian assertions that Somalia should be divided into clan fiefdoms, 
which would institutionalize ethnic politics.
Third, a verdict in favor of the applicants would have established 
clan representation as the foundational criterion for allocating employ-
ment opportunities in the Somali world. This would relegate merit to 
the professional dustbin and would have unimaginable consequences 
for public life. A genealogy-based standard would reinforce current 
staffing patterns in public enterprises that privilege clan identity over 
calibre and citizenship. The current deployment of a clanist yardstick to 
allocate opportunities has already created new fault lines between and 
within communities, as donors succumb to sectarian political activists’ 
wishes. Non-governmental organizations, U.N. agencies, European 
Union representatives, and many other donors use clan identity as a 
litmus test in employing Somali staff inside and outside of the country. 
The first question they ask a candidate is, “What your clan identity?” 
Only those who are deemed to “belong” are employed, thus reinforc-
ing social fragmentation. This practice is not limited to employment; 
it also extends to the provision of social and humanitarian services. 
Galkayo, a town in northeastern Somalia, provides a telling example 
of the problems created by using a genealogy-based standard to allo-
cate public goods. The civil war has torn Galkayo into two parts, each 
ruled by a sectarian leader. When a Swedish NGO approached the 
town about constructing a health clinic in the community, each group 
demanded a separate health facility. The NGO yielded to the ulti-
matum and established two clinics where one would have sufficed.75 
Ironically, enhancing genealogical division and locking people into 
clan ghettos was at the centre of the colonialists’ divide-and-conquer 
strategy. Today, international humanitarian and development agencies 
in Somalia indulge in this practice with impunity. In so doing, these 
agencies fuel a sectarian rather than a civic agenda, despite their claims 
to the contrary.
Fourth, an affirmative ruling for the applicants would have sanc-
tioned the notion that Somalis cannot assess one another profession-
ally, even in British institutions such as the BBC, and will always 
favor individuals from their own genealogical group even when they 
are unqualified. Lewis refers to this idea in his presentation when 
he writes, “Recently reported appointments to the Somali Section…
Abdi Ismail Samatar
81
appear to have altered its clan balance in favour of this grouping” (empha-
sis added). It is germane to note that Lewis had never criticized the 
BBC Somali Service for the clan imbalance of its Somali employees 
prior to this case, despite the existence of such an imbalance. If this 
advice were accepted, it would undo the progress made by the BBC 
World Service in giving skilled speakers of native languages opportu-
nities to head various language departments. Had Lewis’s arguments 
prevailed, only non-Somalis would be able to evaluate Somalis’ quali-
fications, and “native” Somalis would never be able to overcome their 
ingrained “malady.” This assessment may seem harsh, but the record 
demands such a judgment. For example, the EU-sponsored study that 
Lewis directed contains not a single Somali-authored chapter. None of 
the eight contributors, apart from Lewis, had done any prior work in 
Somalia. The implicit message of Lewis’s report is that Somalis are ana-
lytically incapable of contributing to a report of such national import 
because of their clanist tendencies; this perhaps is unsurprising, given 
his claim that a Somali’s guiding principle is “my clansmen right or 
wrong.” Alternatively, Lewis may also be suggesting that Somalis of 
this caliber do not exist. The obvious conclusion, since it is known that 
the latter suggestion is erroneous, is that only non-Somalis of British 
or European extraction have the knowledge, wisdom, and analytical 
sagacity to discern the Somali people’s future. Accepting Lewis’s pro-
posal by genealogizing political identity will deepen the political and 
institutional legacy of colonialism and push Somalia further down the 
slippery slope, which Timaade warned against nearly forty years ago, 
and whose ultimate manifestation is the likes of the Rwandan geno-
cide.
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while dueling verbally with the critics of his government. He would, at the end, calmly 
walk, usually alone, to his house…An equally familiar sight of the period was to find the 
President of the Republic…performing his Maqreb prayers, beside his small Fiat, alone 
or with an ad hoc prayer gathering on the roadside. There just were no reasons then for 
either of them to worry about his personal safety” (Duhul 1996, pp. 2–4).
35. Abdi I. Samatar 2001.
36. Lewis 1992, 1994.
37. Mamdani 1996.
38. The BBC staff union disliked long-running casual contracts and asked the head of 
the Somali Section to terminate this practice. The latter did not like the idea of terminat-
ing casual staff; instead they simply rearranged the contract by reducing the number of 
casual contracts. Yusuf Garaad became head of the Service and inherited the decision to 
terminate the casual contracts. Abdillahi told Garaad to terminate all the casual staff, but 
the latter declined to do so (Haji 2005).
39. Abdillahi Haji indicated that there were no disagreements between him and Garaad 
over the short-list of candidates (Haji 2005).
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41. Blackburn 2002.
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44. Ibid., s2 Q91.
45. Lewis rewrote his first submission after Samatar responded to his original version. 
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way. This second version is not included in the paper; for the sake of fairness, Samatar’s 
response to the second draft is not included either.
46. Samatar and the respondent’s lawyers decided not to forward Samatar’s last word 
until the court hearing began.
47. As late as 1993, Lewis wrote that, “Somali form a single ethnic unit in the Horn of 
Africa stretching from the Awash Valley…to beyond the Tana river” (Lewis 1993, p. 9).
48. Lewis revised his first submission only after Samatar responded to it. The resubmis-
sion is not included, as nearly all of its substance is redundant.
49. Here Lewis clearly equates genealogy with politics and turns Somali history into a 
tomb. Lewis’s strategy seems similar to what Mamdani described as ethnic politics.
50. Lewis is unable to describe how the warlord- and big-men-driven ethnic politics 
is democratic and why the majority of adults are disenfranchised in such operations. 
Again, Lewis confuses past practices in pre-colonial times with contemporary operations 
without attending to the qualitative transformation of these practices.
51. Given these claims, the author has no way of explaining the incredible number of 
conflicts within genealogical groups in each region of the country.
52. Only in a few circumstances is this possible. For instance, it is in no way possible to 
distinguish between Dulbahante and Habar Yonis names in northern Somalia.
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53. Lewis apparently missed the Somali Youth League (SYL), the most important politi-
cal organization in Somali history. Many other political and social organizations have 
had similar qualities.
54. Lewis is unable to fathom the fact that members of such a group, and most other 
Somalis, do not deny their genealogy but reject political ethnicity as a method of con-
ducting public affairs.
55. Again, this ahistorical interpretation of the Somali fails to see that under the aegis of 
Xeer, Somalis did not twist justice to favour their closest genealogical kin. If the latter 
were standard practice, then Xeer would have been a farce.
56. Lewis’s response to Garaad’s written testimony is not included in the text, but is 
presented here for the sake of completeness. This passage from Lewis responds to Gara-
ad’s remarks: “Mr. Yusuf Gerad, of course, writes as a journalist specialising in Somali 
issues. Nevertheless, his statement contains a few errors and omissions, which, at the 
risk of sounding censorious, it seems worth pointing out. Mogadishu is alas no longer 
an ‘extremely multi-cultural city.’ Prior to the recent conquest of the city by Mr. Yusuf 
Gerad’s Habar Ghedir clansmen, and even under the regime of the dictator Mohamed 
Siad Barre, it was indeed so. But not now: it has become a predominantly Hawiye town 
(or more accurately, ghost town). [On the] population [issue], there was actually a cen-
sus, although its findings were much disputed, during the Siad era.
“Hargeisa does not accept that it any longer forms part of Somalia, having recently 
held a national referendum (overwhelmingly supporting independence). Mr. Yusuf 
Gerad is well aware of this as it was reported by the BBC (including his own service) 
among other media.
“[On] Abdulqasim Salad Hassan’s ‘transitional government’: This organisation, which 
has not been elected by the national Somali electorate, and is of debatable constitutional 
legality, owes its existence to a UN sponsored conference held over many months at the 
town of Arta in the neighbouring mini-state of Djibouti. It has no mandate outside the 
small part of Mogadishu it might be said to precariously ‘control,’ and while vigorously 
promoted by the UN secretariat, has failed to gain diplomatic recognition beyond a 
section of the Arab League. Of the neighbouring east African states, Mr. Abdulqasim’s 
regime has been officially recognised only by its patron Djibouti (whose President is 
widely reported as sharing his business interests).
“The governments of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda who take a keen interest are 
evidently waiting to see what happens, and have not recognised the ‘Arta’ faction as its 
Somali opponents call it. This is also the position of the European Union whose member 
states have so far not accorded Mr. Abdulqasim diplomatic recognition.
“[On] powerful warlords: it is not quite true that the two most powerful warlords in 
Mogadishu belong to the same ‘subset’ as Mr. Abdulqasim (and Mr. Yusuf Gerad). They 
actually belong to a different Habar Ghedir ‘sub-set,’ the Sa’ad lineage. Moreover, the 
person who is generally regarded currently as the most powerful warlord is Muse Sudi 
Yalahow who belongs not to Mr. Yusuf Gerad’s Hawiye sub-clan (the Habar Ghedir) but 
to the Abgal sub-clan.
“[On the] definition of clans and their number: as indicated in my submission, I 
would contest this assertion which seems poorly informed, and I find it interesting that 
he only lists the majority clan in Somaliland (the Isaq) marginally. This is, I believe, quite 
a common Hawiye (mis)perception.
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“[On] language: Mr. Yusuf Gerad is not a professional linguist and his remarks about 
the ‘dialect’ spoken by the Digil-Mirifleh, as they call themselves, are somewhat inaccu-
rate. The speech of this large and important Somali clan group (known as ‘Af Maymay’) 
is about as different from ‘standard’ Somali as Portuguese is from Spanish. It and stan-
dard Somali are not actually mutually intelligible.
“[On] the Somali term for ‘clan’-‘qabaiil’: this Arabic loan-word is indeed used by 
Somalis. But the commonest and more authentic Somali term is ‘tol.’
“[On] clan-based history: here Mr. Yusuf Gerad objects to my statements about the 
clan-based organisation of saints’ cults. I think the facts are otherwise and more complex 
than he appears to suppose and would refer him to my recent book Saints and Somalis.”
57. Lewis is apparently oblivious to the revolution in geographic thinking since the early 
1970s and has not read much literature in other social sciences dealing with politics and 
identity.
58. Note the contradiction between the italicized sentences.
59. For the record, Samatar met Garaad only once (in a coffee shop) before the BBC 
approached him to join its team in the case.
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65. Lewis 1988, p. 4.
66. I have eliminated Ms. Lewis’s discussion of the RRA section that identifies the key 
yardsticks of the Act, as this information is included in Mr. Clarke’s submission (para-
graphs 1 and 2).
67. This is an inaccurate statement, since Samatar did most of his primary and secondary 
education before the establishment of Somali script, as well as before the so-called burial 
of “clan politics.”
68. Note that Lewis assumed that employment of Somalis in the BBC should reflect “clan 
balance.” Strangely enough, before the recent hires, the majority of the BBC’s Somali 
employees were Northern Somalis; however, Lewis had never noticed this “imbalance” 
before. I may also add that of the current employees, four were in Samatar’s cohort from 
Amoud Secondary School.
69. Correspondence from BBC legal team to the author. The applicants confirmed this 
information.
70. Amin 1972.
71. Lewis, 30 August 1992.
72. Brigadier General T. Fisher, Military Governor, Shiekh, to Foreign Office, 31 January 
1946. (PRO, FO 1015/132.)
73. Lewis 1995, 2002.
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